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WHY THE BUFFETT-GATES GIVING PLEDGE REQUIRES
LIMlT ATION OF THE ESTATE TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION

by
Edward A. Zelinsky•

Abstract

The Buffett-Gates Giving Pledge, under which
wealthy individuals promise to leave a majority of their
assets to charity, is an admirable effort to encourage
philanthropy. However, the Pledge requires us to confront
the paradox that the federal estate tax charitable deduction
is unlimited while the federal income tax charitable
deduction is capped. If a Giving Pledger leaves his wealth to
charity, the federal fisc loses significant revenue since the
Pledger thereby avoids federal estate taxation as charitable
bequests are deductible without limit for federal estate tax
purposes. Despite its laudable qualities, the Giving Pledge is
a systematic (albeit inadvertent) threat to the estate tax base.
The Giving Pledge requires the amendment of the
federal estate tax to restrict an estate's charitable deduction
to a percentage of the estate, just as the income tax
charitable deduction is limited to a percentage of the
taxpayer's income. In this fashion, the sensible compromise
embedded in the income tax charitable deduction would be
carried over to the federal estate tm: to simultaneously
encourage charitable giving while ensuring that all large
estates pay some federal estate tm.
The Giving Pledge need not be the death knell of the
estate tax. It should instead be the catalyst to reform the tat
by limiting the estate tax charitable deduction.
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INTRODUCTION
1

The emergence of the Giving Pledge is a propitious development in
contemporary America, an admirable effort to encourage philanthropy. The
Giving Pledge is the effort by Warren Buffett and Bill Gates, Jr. to encourage
their fellow billionaires to promise to "give the majority of their wealth
philanthropic causes or charitable organizations either during their lifetimcon in their will."~ However, there is considerable tension between the Givin!!
Pledge and another Buffett-Gates project, the preservation of the federal
estate tax. 3 If a Giving Pledger leaves his wealth to charity, the federal fisc
loses significant revenue since the Pledger thereby avoids federal estate
taxation 4 as charitable bequests are deductible without limit for federal estate
tax purposes. Despite its laudable qualities, the Giving Pledge is a
systematic, albeit unintended, threat to the federal estate tax base.
The Giving Pledge thus requires us to confront the paradox that the
federal estate tax charitable deduction is unlimited while the federal income
tax charitable deduction 5 includes detailed limitations which restrict the
proportion of an individual taxpayer's income which may be deducted as a

to

I. THE GIVING PLEDGE, http://givingpledge.org (last accessed Jan. 6, 2014).
2. Frequently Asked Questions, THE GIVING PLEDGE, http://givingpledge
.org/faq.aspx (last updated Feb. 20, 2014).
3. Signers of Responsible Wealth Statement in Support of Estate Tax, AM.

11, 20 l 2, http://www.americansfortaxfaimess.org/files
/Signers-of-Responsible-Wealth-Statement-in-Support-of-Estate-Tax-12-11 - 12-1030
-am.pdf. Bill Gates, Sr. has been particularly outspoken in support of estate taxation.
However, Bill Gates, Jr. has made clear that he, too, supports the federal estate tax.
Dan Farber, A New Comedy Act: Buffe11 and Gates, CBS NEWS, May 4, 2009,
http://\nnv.cbsnews.com/news/a-new-comedy-act-buffett-and-gates .
.4. The federal gift tax backstops the federal estate tax. All of my
observat10ns ~~out the federal estate tax apply to the federal gift tax, as well. For
ease of expos1t10n, l generally refer only to the federal estate tax. However, such
references also encompass the gift tax and should be so understood.
5. I.R.C. § 170.
FOR TAX REFORM, Dec.
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This approach should be cam·ed over to the
gives al o1 11s income
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estate tax charitable deduction so that every estate8 large eno gh t •
. b'I'
.
u o trigger
federa! estate I1a 1 1t~ w111 pay. s~me estate tax, even if that estate devolves in
its entirety upon charitable rec1p1ents .
. Ideally, the fed~ral estate tax should incorporate the limits the Code
today imposes on the mcome tax deductibility of charitable contributions.
Alternatively, less robust restrictions could be fashioned for the estate tax
charitable deduction such as a deduction limit only applicable to bequests to
private foundations or to certain private foundations.
The Giving Pledge need not be the death knell of the federal estate
tax. The Giving Pledge should, instead, be the catalyst to refonn the tax by
limiting the estate tax charitable deduction.
I come to these conclusions by revisiting important issues which
have generated much fine legal scholarship and public debate: Why pennit
charitable tax deductions? Why levy an estate tax? Ultimately, the argument
for the limitations of the income tax charitable deduction is the desirability of
compromise among the contending rationales for and against a charitable
deduction. The income tax charitable deduction is con\·entionally defended
either as ( 1) an incentive for the donor to contribute his resources to charity,
or (2) as a recognition that the charitable donor sacrifices personal resources
by relinquishing control of donated funds and consequently reduces by such
donations his capacity to pay personal income tax. Counterbala~cing these
considerations are the public fisc's need for revenue, the behe~ that all
taxpayers should contribute something for the governmental services they
utilize, and the view that charitable donations may in important respects
6.1.R.C. § l70(b).

.

7. Since_ the federal gi_fl _tax backstops th~ federal
charitable deduction should be l1m1ted tn the same "ay. See I.
_

ifl 1ax
~~'.e..~;.12lh(:n1imited
§

gift tax charitable deduetion).
. . .
onl 10 bequests to private
8. However if the deducuon hn11 t were to apply y. •i· h estates wm
'
Id ·11
'd II federal estate ta\ t sue
foundations, large estates cou stt avot. a .
h •iabk deduction limit
devoted solely to public charities. I d1s~uss 111/ra a c an
applying only to bequests to private foundations.
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Ioo k more consumptionf ons to such nonqualifying private foun dat10ns
dona 1
..
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·1
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like than do donations to public chant1es wh1c enta1 more sacn ice and less
donor control.
.
. .
The federal estate tax should stnke a similar compromise by
permitting, but limiting, charitable deductions and thereby ensuring that all
large estates pay some federal estate t~x.
th~ one hand_ are the policies of
encouraging charitable bequests to mamtam a ~1brant chan!able sector and of
recognizing that resources transferred to chanty do not directly descend to
the decedent's family. On the other hand, the public fisc has legitimate
claims for the services it provided during the decedent's lifetime. The estate
tax is the final accounting for the governmental benefits the decedent
received while alive. The estates of many contributors to the Giving Pledge
will largely consist of assets with substantial unrealized appreciation. For
these estates, estate taxation provides a rough substitute for the income tax
that the deceased never paid on this unrealized appreciation while alive.
Bequests to a private foundation may, in dynastic fashion, perpetuate
substantial economic and political power for the decedent's family which
controls that foundation.
Permitting, but limiting, the estate tax charitable deductible would
balance these competing concerns. Ideally, such a limit would require that all
large estates pay some federal estate tax, even if they are totally devoted to
charity.
The first Part of this Article describes the evolution and current
limits of the federal income tax charitable deduction. The second Part of this
Article contrasts the limits of the federal income tax charitable deduction
with the unbounded nature of the federal estate tax charitable deduction. The
third Part reviews the arguments for and against the income tax charitable
deduction and the political dynamic underpinning the compromise embedded
in the limitations of the current law on the income tax charitable deduction.
The fourth Part of this Article discusses the debate between proponents and
~pponents_ of the federal estate tax. The fifth and final Part argues that, in
hght of this background, the limitations of the federal income tax charitable
ded_u~tion strike a plausible an~ _stable balance among the contending
~ohc1es and that the same or a similar compromise should be incorporated
mto the federal estate tax charitable deduction to ensure that all large estates
pay at least some federal estate tax. Pem1itting, but limiting, the estate tax
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·table deduction would be a sensible compromise of the co t d'
ch arl
. .
'bl
. .
. n en mg
·cies
as 1t 1s a sens1 e compromise m the context of the income t
l
po l
.
Pl d
.
d .
ax.
The Givmg e
1s an a 1mrable effort to channel wealth to
charity. The Giving Pl~dg_e s commendable success, however, highlights the
tension between the l~m~ted nature of the federal income tax charitable
deduction and the unlimited federal estate tax charitable deduction. This
tension is exacerbated by ( 1) the large amounts the Pledgers have committed
to leave to charity;_(2) the fact that i:nuch of that wealth will, under current
law, never be :~bJected to fed~ral mcome or estate taxation; and (3) the
contending poh_c1es for and a~amst charit~ble deductions. As worthy as the
Giving Pledge 1s, the Pledge 1s a systematic (albeit inadvertent) threat to the
federal estate tax. base. The success of the Giving Pledge will, under current
law, cost the federal Treasury significant revenue because of the estate tax's
unlimited charitable deduction.
In light of the contending considerations and the success of the
Giving Pledge, the compromise embedded in the Code's restrictions on the
income tax deductibility of charitable donations should be incorporated into
the federal estate tax to ensure that all large estates pay some federal estate
tax .

g:

ll .

THE Lt UTS OF THE INCOME TAX CHARITABLE DEDUCTION

The limits of the income tax charitable deduction evolved over half a
century, from the Revenue Act of 1917 through the Tax Refom, Act of 1969.
There have been three hallmarks to that evolution. First, over time, the limits
on the income tax charitable deduction have been liberalized even as the
perpetuation of those limits has never been seriously challenged. Second,
these limits are bifurcated with higher charitable deduction caps applying for
income tax purposes to donations to public charities and to qualifying private
foundations and lower deduction caps governing donations to all other
private foundations. Third, these deduction limits, having evolved over
several generations, have been stable since 1969. Thus, the Code today
embodies the settled policy that a charitable donor should pay some income
tax even if he contributes all of his income to charity.
'
Shortly after the modem federal income tax was established in
1916,9 the Revenue Act of 1917 added to the income tax a limited deduction
for individuals• contributions "to corporations or associations organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific: or educa;tional
purposes, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals,

9. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271 , 39 Slat. 756·

I
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no art of the income of which inures to the benefit of any private
p
. . .d I ,,10
stockholder or md1v1 ua . .
.
.
This original version of the fed~ral mcom~ tax charitable deduction
s taxable
mcome
was res tricted to I 5 percent11 of the donor
•
. • •
c
. calculated With out
1
1
ritable
deduction.
In
this
m1tia
,ormu
at1on,
the income t
the cha
. bl
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ax
·t
ble
deduction
treated
alike
all
chanta
e
contn
utions
as
an
individ
h
c an a
..
d .
ua 1
m the statute We
taxp aye r's contributions to the charities enumerate
,
bl .
,
re
deductible up to I 5 percent of the taxpayer s _taxa e mcome. 1~ This limit
·nitiated the principle, now deeply embedded m the Code, that a taxpaye
~ho donates all of his income to charity still pays federal income taxes.
r
The next important innovation in this area was the adoption of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which both increased and, for the first time
bifurcated the limit on individuals' charitable contribution deductions. Th~
1954 Code distinguished contributions to churches, hospitals, and schools
from donations to all other charities, favoring contributions to the fonner
over donations to the latter. As part of this change, the Code created the
13
concept of an individual taxpayer's "contribution base," the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income for the year calculated without any net operating
. d over to sue h year. 14
losses came
Section 170 of the original 1954 Code provided that an individual
taxpayer could deduct for income tax purposes contributions to churches,
hospitals, and schools up to 30 percent of her contribution base. In contrast,
the deduction for contributions to all other charities was limited to 20 percent
of the individual taxpayer's contribution base. If a taxpayer's donations to
these other, less favored charities met or exceeded 20 percent of the
taxpayer's contribution base, the taxpayer could still deduct up to an
additional ten percent of his contribution base for donations to schools,
hospitals, and churches.
10. War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300,
330.
11. Id. In this original incarnation, there was no carryover of contributions
in excess of ~he current year's deduction. Thus, if an individual donated to any
specified charity an amount equal to 25 percent of his current year's taxable income
computed without a charitable deduction, the portion of the contribution up to the 15
percent ceiling was deductible but the rest contributed to charity was permanently
nondeductible.
.
12. In _I 936, Congress extended to corporations a similarly limikd
char~table dedu~t10~. The Revenue Act of 1936 permitted a corporation to deduct
charitable c~ntnbut1on~ up .to five percent of its taxable income computed without
such deduction. T_h1s limit 1s t?day embodied in section l 70(b)(2)(A) which limits
the corporat~ charitable deduction to ten percent of the corporation's taxable income
calculated without reference to the charitable deduction. I.R.C. § J70(b)(2)(A).
13. I.R.C. § I70(b)(l)(G).
14./d.
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. .
11m1t was
·
d"
'd
I
'
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·
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research organization s . In 1962, Congress appl' d h . ia e "medical
'b .
..
ie I e high 30
limit to contr~ ut1ons to enttlles supporting public colle
er. percent
3nd
ln 1964, this favored treatment was extended fu:se u~iv~rs_ities.16
contributions to states and localities17 and to charitabl r t~ ~d1v1duals'
••nonnally receive[l a substantial part of [their] su ~.?ianizat1ons which
government or "from the general public."'s
ppo
om state or local
The 1964 Act, by subjecting charities sup ned
,.
public" to the higher, 30 percent contribution limit:on foby the general
Tax Reform Act of 1969.19 The 1969 Act framed the inc~m/:~adowe~ the
deduction limits as we know them today and introdu d .
s chantable
.
.. .
.
ce into the Code th
distinction between pnvate foundations" and "public charities.""o
e
I 5. Act of Aug. 7, 1956, ch. 1031, 70 Stat. II 17.
16. Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-858, § 2, 76 Stat. 1134 II34
17. Revenue Aet of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 209(a) 78 S ' 19 ·
18. l.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(A)(vi); Revenue Act of 1964, P~b. L.~~- 8:~72 §

209(a), 78 Stal. 19, 43. The 1964 Act also added r.a""'over prov·15·
h.' h
· bl d d ·
·
-·,
ions w 1c
pennitted chanta ~ e ucttons m excess of the current year's limit to be camed
over and deducted m subsequent years. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272 §
209(c)(l), 78 Stal. 19, 45.
'
l 9. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
20. The distinction between private foundations and public charities \\as
also presaged by section 331 of the Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. &I~ 14, 64
Stat. 957, which added section 3813 and section 3814 to the 1939 Code. Section
3g 13 of the 1939 Code became section 503 of the 1954 Code. Before the Ta.x
Refom1 Act of 1969 became effective in 1970, section 503 proscribed ''prohibited
transactions" with certain section 501(c)(3) charities. The charities subject 10 the
prohibited transaction rules of section 503 were defined residually as all exempt
organizations other than the groups today labeled as pubhc charities under seclion
509(a)( L). Thus, section 503 largely applied to the institulions classified as private
foundations by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Section 503 remains in the Code in
highly attenuated form. lt_ has l~gely ~en superseded by se~tion 4941 (penalizing
"self-dealing" between private foundations and persons pos1uoned to control them)
and section 4975 (penaliz.ing "prohibited transactions" bet\\een tax-exempt
retirement trusts and persons positioned to control them).

./()()
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As a result of the 1969 Act, the Code classifies all
.
'1
.
.
. h
.. bl"
h . . ,,
section
50l(c)(3t ,~rgamzat1o~s ash e1 t er pu 1c c_ ant~es"·- or ''private
foundatjons··- and subJ~cts t_ e 1att~r to reg~ Iation_ inapplicable to the
fonner:~ In contrast to private toundat1ons, public charities are regulated

1
heavily because public ch_arities "ei_ther ~ave broad public support or activ;~~
functi?n . in -~ supporting relat1onsh1p to such [publicly supported~
5
oruamzat1ons.
~
As a result of t~e 1969 ~ct. ~our ca~~go~!es of section 50l(c)(J)
organizations are denominated as ·public charities. The Code then defines
priYate foundations residually, as any section 50l(c)(3) tax-exempt charitv
which does not fit into one of these four public charity categories. 26
•
First, under section 509(a)(l), a section 50l(c)(3) entity is a public
charity, rather than a private foundation, if it is one of the entities favored
before 1969 with the higher 30 percent deduction limit, that is, a church, a
school, a hospital, a hospital-affiliated medical research organization, an
organization supporting a public college or university, a state or locality, or a
charitable organization nonnally receiving substantial support from state or
local government or from the general public. 27
Second, under section 509(a)(2), a section 501(c)(3) entity (even
though not one of these listed entities) is a public charity, rather than a
private foundation, if it meets two arithmetic tests to demonstrate that it is
nonnally publicly supported. 2s An example of a public charity under section

Section 331 of the Revenue Act of I 950 also added to the 1939 Code
section 38 I 4 denying tax exemption to organizations if their income was
accumulated unreasonably, used for nonexempt purposes, or invested in a manner
which jeopardized the organization's exemption function. These ideas are today
implemented in more elaborate form by the network of regulatory taxes pertaining to
private foundations. See l.R.C. §§ 4942 (penalty ta-..: on private foundation's "failure
to distribute income.. ); 4945 (penalty tax on private foundation's "taxable
expenditure"); 4944 (penalty tax on private foundation which "invests any amount in
such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes").
21. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
22. Rev. Rul. 2003- 13, 2003-1 C.B. 305.
23. I.R.C. § 509.
24. I.R.C. §§ 4940-46.
25. Reg. § l.509(a)- I.
26. l.R.C. § 509.
27. LR.C. § 509(a)( I).
28. The first of these arithmelic tests for section 509(a)(2) public charity
status is that a section 50l(c)(J) entity must "nonnally'' receive more than ··one third
of its support'' from any combination of "gifts. grants, contributions. [ ) membership
fees" and "gross receipts from admissions, sales of merchandise, perfommnce or
services, or furnishing of facilities." I.R.C. § 509(a)(1)(A). Second, the entity must
not "nonnally" receive more than "one-third of its support" from passive
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509(a)(2) is a ?onpro~t museum which qu~lifies as tax-exempt under section
SOl(c)(3), wluch receives no ~ndowment mcome and which supports itself
solely from annual membership dues, patro_ns' admissions fees when they
nter the museum, and revenues from a gift shop which sells art-related
:oaks, reprints, and souvenirs. This museum is supported solely from
membership dues, receipts from admissions, and sales of art-related
merchandise, and therefore qualifies as a public charity under section
509(a)(2).
In contrast, assume that a nonprofit museum endowed by a wealthy
donor receives more than one-third of its support from the passive
investment income generated by this endowment. 29 This museum is a private
foundation since it is neither one of the traditionally favored forms of charity
specified in section 509(a)(l) nor does it meet the mathematical tests for
public support under section 509(a)(2). Consequently, as a private foundation
rather than a public charity, this museum must comply with the tighter
regulation that private foundation classification entails. 30
The third fonn of public charity under section 509(a)(3) is an
organization which supports either a section 509(a)(l) public charity (one of
the previously favored section 50l(c)(3) groups such as a school, church, or
hospital) or which supports a section 509(a)(2) public charity (such as our
hypothetical museum which receives all its income from membership fees,
admissions receipts, and art-related sales). 31 In effect, a section 509(a)(3)
support organization piggybacks off the public charity status of the taxexempt entity the section 509(a)(3) organization supports.
Finally, section 501(c)(3) entities "organized and operated
exclusively for testing for public safety" are public charities.32

"investment income" and "unrelated business taxable income." l.R.C. §
509(a)(2)(B).
29. A well-known example would be the J. Paul Getty Museum, ~pe~ted
by the J. Paul Getty Trust, a private foundation. See Form 990-PF (Return of Pnvate
Foundation) for fiscal year ending 6/30/10 of the J. Paul Getty Trust
http://www.getty.edu/about/governance/pdfs/990pf-201 0.pdf.
30. 1.R.C. §§ 4940-46.
31 . 1.R.C. § 509(a)(3).
.
32. l.R.C. § 509(a)(4). Organizations undertaking public safety tesll~g ~ave
a unique status sin~e they are tax-exempt under section 50l(c)_(3) but contnbutton~
to such organizations arc not income tax deductible under sectt0n _I ?O(c)_- Comp,lr~
l.R.C. § SOl(c)(3) (''testing for public safety" is a tax-exempt functt~n) wuh l.~.C.}
l 70(c)(2)(8) (not listing such testing as a charitable acti~ity). I~ its mt~rp_retall~~i~h
the term "testing for public safety" the IRS has d1stmguished tcStmg ~
f
.. • .
• .
,. ·t rs" from safety testml! o
pnnc1pally serves the private interest ol the manu,a1.: ure
-, c- 8
78
..consumer
.
products used by the ~encral publ.1c." Rev. Rul · 78-P6
- ' 19 -- · ·
17S.
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Instructive in this context is the legislative history of they R
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vigorous
an d extensive
.
.
h
.
ti d .
.II
rov1de
approp:rafute adss~ranches. t bait private o~~ at1ons w1 promptly and properly
use their n s 1or c arita e purposes.
Among the abuses requiring tighter regulation of private foundati
·
tioun dat1on
· to improper
·
Iy benefit those who contons
were the "use of a private
36
. " as we II as the " unreasona bl e" accumu 1anon
· of wealth
ro 1
the tioun dat1on
37
inside private foundations. A particular concern was "[t]he use of
foundations to maintain control of businesses, particularly small familv
corporations." 38 "Those who wish to use a foundation's stock holdings 1;
retain business control in some cases are relatively unconcerned about
producing income to be used by the foundation for charitable purposes."39
To combat the abuse of private foundations and their resources, the
Tax Refonn Act of 1969 added to the Code the network of regulatory taxes
applying to such foundations. 40 Among these are a penalty tax levied on
private foundations which fail to distribute for charitable purposes an annual
amount equal to at least five percent of the fair market value of their assets 41
and a penalty tax on "self-dealing" transactions between private foundations
and the insiders who control them. 42
The 1969 Act, even as it liberalized the limits of the income tax
charitable deduction, reinforced the bifurcated nature of those limits: the
deduction for individuals' donations to nonqualifying private foundations is
capped at a lower percentage of the donor's contribution base (30 percent)
33. LR.C. § 509(a).
34. I.R.C. §§ 4940-46.
35. H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. I, at 19 (1969).
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 25.
38. Id. at 27.

39. Id. Among other abuses motivating the reforms of the 1969 Act wen:
private foundations' "use [of] their money for 'educational' grants to enable people
to take vacations abroad, to have paid interludes between jobs, and to subsidize the
preparation of materials furthering spcci fie political viewpoints." Id. at 33.
40. I.R.C. §§ 4940-46.
41. LR.C. § 4942.
42. 1.R.C. § 4941.
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than is ~he d~duction for donations to public charities and to certain private
foundations.
A higher 50 percent deduction limit applies to gifts to ubl'
44
. d
·
·
.
p IC
charities as well a~ to onati~ns to private :otm_dattons deemed less prone to
dynastic accumulations. Spe~1fically, contributions to a private foundation
qualify for the 50 percent mcome tax deduction limit if the foundation
satisfies one of three statutory tests. The first of these tests is that the
foundation be a "private operating foundation" engaged in the "active
4
conduct'' of charitabl~ functions. ~ For_ex?mple, an endowed museum might
be a private operatmg foundatton 1f It meets the necessary statutory
requirements indi~ating th?t i_t conducts active operations.~6 The second type
of private foundation quahfymg for the SO percent deduction limit is a passthru foundation which distributes, rather than accumulates, all contributions
47
made to it. Third, donations to a private foundation are subject to the 50
percent income tax deduction limit if the donee foundation would have
qualified as a section S09(a)(3) support organization but for the ability of
substantial contributors to designate the particular recipients of the
· , s support.48
foun datton
Individuals' income tax deductions for contributions to all other
private foundations are limited to 30 percent of the donor's contribution
base.49 If, for example, an endowed museum, which is a private foundation,
43. Compare l.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(A) with I.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(B). This
bifurcation is bolstered by special limits added 10 the Code for individuals' in-kind
charitable contributions of "capital gain property" such as appreciated stocks and
bonds. If, instead of contributing cash, an individual taxpayer donates capital gain
property to a public charity or to a qualifying private foundation, the applicable
deduction limit is 30 percent of the donor's contribution base. However, if an
individual taxpayer instead transfers capital gain property to a nonqualifying private
foundation, that is, a private foundation which is not an operating, pass-thru, or
supporting foundation, the deduction is limited to 20 percent of the donor's
contribution base. 1.R.C. §§ l 70(b)( I )(C)(i), I70(b)( I)(C)(iv), I 70(b)( l)(D)(i).
44. While public testing organizations are tax-exempt under section
S01(c)(3), donations to such testing organizations do not qualify as charitable under
section l 70(c). See supra note 32.
45. l.R.C. §§ l70(b)(l)(A)(vii), 170(b)(l)(F)(i).
46. Reg.§ 53.4942(b}-l(d), Ex. l.
47. I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(l)(A)(vii), \70(b)(l)(F)(ii).
48. l.R.C. §§ l 70(b)(l)(A)(vii), l 70(b)(l)(F)(iii).
.
.,
49. LR.C. § 170(b)( I )(B). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 _left intact thefi
percent deduction cap for donor's contributions to private foundatw~s. _The De icit
Reduction Act of 1984 subsequently increased the deduction hnut ~or cash
·
·
·
base
contn'but1ons
to private
foun dallons
to 30 percent of the donor's
. contnbut10n
.
while retaining the 20 percent deduction limit for in-kind contributions of prope~1·
See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 30l(a), (c), 98 stat. 4 •
777- 79.

~?

40./

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 16:7

fails to qualify as an operating foundation, as a pass-thru foundation, or as a
support foundation, an individual donor to that museum may, for income tax
purposes, deduct contributions to suc~ museum only up to 30 percent of the
0
donor's contribution base for the year.
Three themes emerge from the evolution of the limitations of the
federal income tax charitable deduction: liberalization, bifurcation, and
stability. Since the Tax Refon11 Act of 1969, individual donors have been
able to deduct up to 50 percent of their respective contribution bases for
donations to public charities and to qualifying private foundations. This 50
percent deduction limit is over three times the original 15 percent deduction
limit established by the Revenue Act of 1917. Even the lower limit which
today caps deductions for gifts to nonqualifying private foundations-3o
percent of the donor's contribution base-was the pre-1969 limit for
contributions to favored charities as they were then defined. Thus, the
direction of the tax law has been the liberalization of the limits on the income
tax charitable deduction.
However, the existence of charitable deduction limits has never been
seriously contested. Thus, the liberalization of the restrictions on the income
tax charitable deduction has been constrained by the assumptions that such
restrictions will continue to exist and that all charitable donors will pay some
income tax, even if they donate all of their incomes to charity. 51
50. Any contribution above that limitation would carryover for possible
deductibility in subsequent years. The deduction carryover for contributions to
private foundations was added to the Code by section 30 I (b) of The Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 778.
51. Instructive in this context is an "unlimited" charitable deduction,
available under rarefied circumstances between 1939 and I 969. Section 120 of the
Internal Revenue Code of I 939, I.R.C. § 120 ( I 939), permitted an individual
taxpayer to deduct for income tax purposes all of her charitable contributions in the
current year if, in that current year "and in each of the ten preceding taxable years,"
federal income, "war-profits" and "excess-profits" taxes plus charitable contributions
absorbed more than 90 percent of the taxpayer's taxable income determined without
a charitable deduction. Slightly modified, this unlimited charitable deduction was
continued in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 but was phased out by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969. In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, this unlimited charitable
deduction was repealed altogether. See l.R.C. § 170(b )( 1)( C) (1954 ); Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §201(a), 83 Stat. 487, 549 (phasing out the
unlimited charitable deduction); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90
Stat. 1520 (eliminating the unlimited charitable deduction).
At one level, this unlimited charitable deduction was something of a
~ur!o~ity as it was available only under very esoteric circumstances, namely, an
md1v1dual taxpayer who, for a decade, spent more than 90 percent of her taxable
!ncome on ~ederal income taxes and charity. On the other hand, the policy
implemented m the Tax Reform Acts of 1969 and 1976 is instructive: as the limits of
the income tax charitable deduction were liberalized for most individual taxpayers,
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Moreover, the deduction limits, as they have e
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While the lnmtabttons o tkedm~ome· tax ~~aritable deduction for individuai
taxpayers have cen twea ' e smce I969, the basic structure h
.
. .
h h .
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h
intact since t en, restnctmg t e c antable deduction to a percent
f h
.b . b
.f h
age o t e
donor's contn ut1on ase even 1 s e donates all of her income to charity.
11 l.

TH E ESTATE TAX CHARITABLE DEDUCTION

In cont~ast to the fe~eral income tax charitable deduction, the federal
estate tax charitable deduction has been unlimited since its inception and
remains so today. The Revenue Act of 191653 established the modem federal
5
estate tax. The Revenue Act of 1918 ~ added a deduction to the estate tax for
[t]hc amount of all bequests, legacies, devise, or gifts, to or
for the use of the United States, any State, Territory, any
political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, for
exclusively public purposes, or to or for the use of any
corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes,
including the encouragement of art and the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or
individual, or to a trustee or trustees exclusively for such
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes. ss

the importance of those limits was atlirmed by the abolition ?f the unlimited
deduction available to the few taxpayers meeting the stringent tests introduced by the
1939 Code.
52. See supra notes 43 and 51.
.
53. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200-l 2, 39 stat. 7' 6• 777 ·
54. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.
55. Id. at§ 403(a)(3), 1098.
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Over the years, Congress has expanded the definition of cha - .
n1res for
estate tax purposes just as Congress has en Iarged the scope of the defi . .
.
rn111on
of charitable donees for mcome tax purposes. Thus, today eni· .
encouraging amateur sports 56 as we JI as veterans groups s1 qualify as do rties
.
.
.
~~
for both the income tax and estate tax charitable deductions. Neverthele
today's unlimited federal estate tax deduction is recognizably the unlimit:d
deduction first promulgated in 19 I 8.
.

IV.

WHY HA VE CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS?

Among the seminal figures in the debate about the charitable
deduction was Professor Stanley Surrey who first formulated the theory of
tax expenditures, that is, some deductions, credits and other provisions of the
tax law are designed, not to measure a taxpayer's ability to pay, but to
subsidize, penalize, or reward certain fonns of behavior. Tax expenditures.
Professor Surrey influentially argued, should be compared with direct
spending programs designed to subsidize, penalize, or reward the same
behavior. 58 For Professor Surrey and his followers, the income tax charitable
deduction is classic tax expenditure, a feature of the Code which does not
measure the taxpayer's capacity to pay tax. Rather, the income tax's
charitable deduction is "a method of providing federal financial assistance to
private philanthropy.''59
Federal tax expenditure budgets reflect this characterization,
classifying the federal income tax charitable contribution deduction as a
major tax expenditure. 60 As a tax expenditure, the deduction is projected to
entail a revenue loss for fiscal 2014 in excess of$40 billion. 61

56. l.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B), 2055(a)(2).
57. I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(3), 2055(a)(4).
58. Professor Surrey's seminal articulation of the tax expenditure theory
was Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705
(1970) [hereinafter Surrey, Tax Incentives]. Among his other important \.vritings on
tax expenditures were STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973)
[hereinafter SURREY, PATHWAYS] and STANLEY s. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL,
TAX EXPENDITURES (1985) [hereinafter SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES].
59. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 58, at 224.
60. See, e.g.. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES
OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017 39 (Comm. Print
13) ("?edu.ction f~r charitabl~ co~tributions to educational institutions"); id at 40
( d~?uctwn_for ~hanta~le contnbut10ns, other than for education and health''); id at
41 ( deduction for charitable contributions to health organizations'').
61. ld
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person m the first
ln conttas~, others reject the tax expenditure label
.
charitable deductton and conclude that the ded t· . as applied to the
•
~~m~ap
·
the taxpayer's ability to a F th
propnate
Provision for measunng
•
P Y· or ese observ
charitable donations
represent sacrifice of personal
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In this vein, another seminal figure in the debate about th h · bl
.
~
W"\\"
e C anta e
deduction, Pro1essor
1 1am D. Andrews, started with the famo
H· •
.
.
f
.
us a1g
Simons deti1mtton o income as the sum of the taxpayers' savings and
consumption. From this premise, Professor Andrews argued that
consumption for income tax purposes should mean "private consumption"
or, even more restrictively, "private, preclusive household consumption:"°5
From this vantage, resources transferred by a taxpayer to charity should be
deducted to properly measure the taxpayer's net income since those
transferred resources benefit the community at large or some significant
segment of that community rather than the taxpayer herself.66 The income ta,
charitable deduction thus defines the base of the income tax to measure the
net income on which the taxpayer should pay tax.
Professor William J. Turnier summarized this argument for the
income tax charitable deduction as a means of measuring the taxpayer's
capacity to pay:

62. As a procedural matter, Professor Surrey's chief cl~ims ,~ere that, in the

legislative process, tax expenditures are I~~ visi~l~ th: ~~:t~t:~:n:u~::r~~:;
tax expenditures are formulated and adrnmtstered_t yes address For discussion and
. . •
·h
r1· · the areas the expen I ur
·
mstttuttons wit expe 1se m
ard A z r10 ky Do Ta.t Expendi111res Create
criticism of these arguments, see Edw
· e ~ 'E:cemptions and the Parado.t
Framing Effects? Vol11nteer_Firefighters-::1:~'>' ~t (2005); Ed,~ard A.. Zelinsky,
79

of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. T
. · 1 . A Procedural Defense of Tax
· Cl · e at G11cc1 0 u c11·
James Madison and PII blic wic
L J 1165 (1993).
Expenditures and Tax lnstit11tions. 102 YALE . . 8 122· SURREY & MCDANIEL,
63. Surrey, Tax Incentives, s11pra note 5 'at '
TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 58, at 79 ·
58 at 225
64. SURREY, PATHWAYS, s11pr~ not~ Dttd11ctio11~ in an Ideal Income_ Tat, 86
65. William D. Andrews, Pet son_a ft Andrews, Personal Ded11c11ons].
HARV. L. REV. 309,313,371 (1 9?2) [herema

66. lei. at 344.
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Because our income tax is an individual, rather than
societal, tax, only the benefit that each individual derive:
from public programs should be designated as consumption
. . . . It is therefore necessary to adopt a definition of
consumption grounded on the view that an out flow of funds
resulting in a diminution of an individual's net worth shall
not be deemed consumption if the outflow provides a
substantial benefit to the general public and an insignificant
private benefit to the party making the expenditure. 67
This vantage buttr~sses the bifur~ated ~ature of the individual
income tax limits on c~ant_able contributions smce ~on~tions to public
charities are more pubhc m nature than are contributions to private
foundations, which often entail significant private, consumption-like benefit
for the donor and his family.
Professor Boris Bittker was also a tax expenditure critic and viewed
the charitable deduction as an appropriate, base-defining feature of an
income tax, given the judgments inherent in designing tax and budget
policies: 68 "[t]he assertion that a deduction for charitable contributions is
inconsistent or incompatible with a proper measure of taxable income is
. ,,69
devo1'd of ment.
Professor Bittker favored an unlimited charitable deduction
contending that the income tax limits of section 170 only make sense "as;
compromise between those who believe in a [charitable] deduction and those
who would repeal it." 70 Since Professor Bittker strongly believed in the
deduction, he went so far as to label such compromise "preposterous." 71 As J
will discuss below, the compromise which Professor Bittker viewed
negatively is now a long-standing feature of the federal income tax. It makes
sense to extend that compromise, in the form of deduction limits, to the
estate tax charitable deduction to ensure that all large estates pay some estate
tax-or to at least get closer to that ideal.
As the debate over the income tax charitable deduction has
progressed, commentators have both elaborated these initial themes and
introduced new ones. Professor Mark P. Gergen, for example, is highly
critical of Professor Andrews' defense of the income tax charitable

67. William J. Turnier, Evaluating Persona{ Deductions in 011 lncomt! Ta.,·
- The Ideal, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 262,274 ( 1981 ).
68. Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contribwions: Tax Deductions or Matching
Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37 (1972) [hereinafter Bittker, Matching GrantsJ.
69. Id. at 56.
70. Id. at 62.
71. Id.

f
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Professor John D. Colombo similarly views the chan·t bl d d •
.
.
a e e uct1on,
along with tax exemption, as a means of channe1·1
•
· ·
· h
ng assistance to
orgaruzanons wh1c suffer from underfunding because of free ·d· n
..-r1s.
n mg.
. Professor Ray_ D. Madon _is perturbed that the subsidy embedded in
the mcome tax chantab\e deduction "is only available to the charitable
donations of the very wealthy ... those who itemize their deductions ,,79
Moreover, she finds this subsidy for the charitable donations of the affiue~t

particularly troubling due to the fact that wealthy Americans
tend to make very different types of bequests than their
countrymen. While most Americans direct their charitable
dollars to religious organizations, approximately three
quarters of all bequests reported on estate tax returns go
either to private foundations or educational institutions.80
Private foundations, Professor Madoff argues, expend inordinate
amounts of their tax-subsidized resources compensating the trustees and
professional investment managers who manage such foundations and such
foundations' endowments.81

72. Mark p. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction,
74VA. L.REv. l393, 1414-26(1988).
73. Id. at 1450.
74. Id. at 1398, 1448.
75. Id. at 1405.
76. Id. at 1447.
Cl · bl
77 John D Colombo The Marketing of Philanthropy and t!1e ,ar11a.,. e
·
·
'
.
.,.
· fi the Deductwn and I at
Contributions Deduction: Integratmg 1 1, 1eones or
Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657 (200Hl).I / Can Teach Us Abo111 the
78 Ray D Madoff Whal Leona e ms ey
.
.
. .
,K
L REV 957 (2010).
Charitable
Deduction,
85 CHI.- ENT •
·
79. Id. at 965.
80. Id. at 966.
81. Id. at 973.
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. In a ~imilar vein, Professor Ilan Benshalom criticizes the charitable
deduction as 1t
"promotes a nondemocratic decision-making process for
allocating public money. Rather than deciding the allocation
of public funds through majoritarian decision-making
processes, charitable relief allows individuals to decide how
to allocate a share of public resources at the expense of the
majority." 83
In contrast to the cnttque of the charitable deduction as
antidemocratic, Dean Saul Levmore views the charitable deduction as a form
84
of "direct democracy." Each donor's contribution to a particular charity is
his "ballot" by which he channels publicly-funded tax subsidy to the charity
of his choice. In light of the imperfections of conventional electoral and
legislative decisionmaking, "the charitable deduction may be a relatively
clever tool"85 for "gathering information about majoritarian or other
preferences."86
Moreover, Dean Levmore suggests that the charitable deduction may
have other benefits in maintaining a vibrant charitable sector. For example,
the charitable deduction
induce[s] citizens not only to choose for themselves where to
apply personal and government funds, but also to develop a
sense of commitment to the chosen charities. Thus, they
become involved individually as volunteers in ways that
they would not if their tax money were simply allocated to
the charities by the legislature or by government
bureaucrats.87

82. Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84
IND. L.J. I 047 (2009).
83. Id. at I050.
84. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387,426 (1998).
85. Id. at 409. See also id. at 413 ("one advantage of balloting through
charitable donations (as precursors to later deductions) is a reduction in the
collective choice problem associated with appropriating funds through either a
conventional popular ballot or a checkoff device. This form of balloting through the
tax system is likely to be a superior collective choice procedure.").
86. Id. at 409.
87. Id. at 406.
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charitable deduction went _beyond the defense of the deduction as :~ase~
defining-measure, calculatmg the ta~payer's capacity to pay. Rather, these
advocates asserted that t~e deduction "~elps correct market or political
failures" and thereby mcreases public goods "that are otherwise
underprovided because of free-rider and other challenges."90 Yet other
proponents laud the charitable deduction because it "helps decentralize the
.
,,,91
spendmg process.
[s]upporters note both the diversity and the higher quality of
charitable goods and services that come from programs
funded by individuals who devote money, and often time
and expertise, in selecting, managing, and monitoring
activities that often benefit society at large, rather than those
programs selected by some Washington bureaucrat and
managed and monitored by government employees.92

•

On the other hand, Professor Zolt notes that the income tax
93
charitable deduction has its costs, including "foregone revenue" and, as
Professor Surrey first observed, the deduction's "upside-down" effect. To
Professor Surrey and those who have followed his lead, charitable donations
represent consumption which properly remains part of the income tax base
rather than sacrifice of personal resources properly giving rise to a deduction.
In political terms, the compromises embedded in the limits on the income tax
charitable deduction reflect a stable stalemate between, on the one hand, the
charities benefitting from the deduction and, on the other, the federal
Treasury as the gatekeeper protecting public revenues. The chari!able sector
94
is a well-organized and well-financed lobbying force in Washmgton. In

88. Eric Zoll, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: DomeStic

•

Activities, Foreign Activities, or None ofthe Above, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361 <2012).
89. Id. at 364.
90. id.
91. Jd.
92. id. at 365.

93. id.
S
R last accessed Sept. 25,
94. See, e.g., Policy & Advocacy, l~DEP. ECTO ' "We serve as a voice
2014, https://www.independentsector.org/pohcy_a~vo:acy (
t ry and economic
1
~nd source of information on the most pressing legtSlative, regu a :~ COUNCIL ON
tsSues facing the nonprofit sector."); MOLLY CORBETT BROAD,
·
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tension with it, the Treasury keeps score of tax expenditures, 95 an intl
.
. a wor Id o f b udgetary constraint.
. Th e c hanties
· · receiving ded uential
task m
.
donations would undoubtedly prefer further liberalization of the deducti_6le
. .
.
uct1on
hmtts. The ta~ expend1tur_e bu_dge_t annually tells Congress the cost of the
current deduction and, by 1mphcat1on, the revenues to be gained by Jim•.the deduction further, as well as the expense to the Treasury of fu~~ng
liberalizing the deduction's limits. For two generations, these contend· er
forces have, in political terms, offset each other, leaving intact the inco~g
tax charitable deduction limits Congress fashioned in 1969.
e
V.

SHOULD THERE BE A FEDERAL ESTATE TAX?

Just as the federal income tax charitable deduction has triggered
exhaustive debate, the federal estate tax has been the subject of extensive
discussion. Among the arguments advanced by estate tax proponents are that
the tax raises revenues for the federal fisc, that the estate tax contributes to
the overall progressivity of federal taxation, that the estate tax backstops the
federal income tax, and that the estate tax disperses inherited concentrations
of wealth. Some opponents of the estate tax support these goals but argue
that the estate tax does not effectively implement them. Other opponents of
the estate tax challenge these goals while denouncing the estate tax as
immoral and inefficient. Because this debate has focused on whether there
should be an estate tax, little attention has been given to the implications of
the estate tax's unlimited charitable deduction.
Prominent among estate tax proponents is Bill Gates, Sr. Attorney
Gates is a leader of Responsible Wealth, a pro-estate-tax lobbying effort
supported by affluent individuals including Warren Buffett, George Soros,
Robert Rubin, John Bogle, Dr. Abigail Disney, Dr. Richard Rockefeller,
Robert Crandall, and Norman Lear. 96 Attorney Gates' support of the estate
tax derives from the premise "that society has a just claim on the
accumulated wealth of its most prosperous citizens.'' 97 This claim stems from
''the undervalued role of society's investment in each of us. This investment
98
is substantial and often invisible. "
Starting from this premise, Attorney Gates identifies several virtues
of the federal estate tax. Chief among these is that the estate tax is "a
EDUC., COMMENTS TO THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COl\1MITTEE TAX REFORI\I
WORKING GROUP ON CHARITABLE/EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2013 ).
95. See supra note 60.
96. Signers of Responsible Wealth Statement in Support of Estate Tax,
supra note 3.
97. WILLIAM H. GATES SR. & CHECK COLLINS, WEAL TH AND 0l1R
COMMONWEALTH: WHY AMERICA SllOULD TAX ACCUMULATED fORlUNES I 10
(2002) [hereinafter GATES SR. & COLLINS, WEAL rn AND OUR COI\ll\!ONWl:ALTII].
98. ld.
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endable and highly progressive source of revenue"99 and th h
d ep
•
d
-•
.
at t e tax
po1itica1 equality and opportunity by d' . . h'
fu rthers economic an
.
100 "
imm1s mg
inherited concentrations of wealth:
[t]he estate tax both limits the power
and generates revenue to pay for govemment from
o f concentrated wealth,,101
those most able to pay.
Attorney Gates also argues that the estate tax is "a cons'd bl
.
· bl · · ,,102 A 1 . .
1 era e
incentive to chanta e giving.
s will discuss, there is tension between
on the one hand, the arguments that the estate tax raises revenue and
deconcenttates wealth and, on the other, the unlimited nature of the estate tax
charitable deduction. The deduction both costs the federal fisc revenue and
at least as to gifts to private foundations, may perpetuate dynastic fortunes. '
Attorney Gates makes clear his agreement with estate tax opponents
that, before President George W. Bush's estate tax reforms, the tax applied
too broadly. In 200 I, the tax was levied on taxable estates over $675,000.1°3
In contrast, Attorney Gates states that an exemption of $3,500,000 per
decedent is "fair" and "targets the tax on those most able to pay." 10-I He also
identifies a household net worth of $15,000,000 as the threshold at which
further accumulations go "beyond the point of meeting [the household's]
105
needs and aspirations of itself and its heirs." It thus appears that the current
federal estate tax, which exempts for each decedent $5,000,000 of wealth
106
adjusted for inflation, falls within or close to the parameters of a Gatesacceptable estate tax.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker allies himself
with Attorney Gates' arguments for a federal estate tax "on truly huge
107
fortunes:"
[T]he concept of equality of opportunity and dispersion of
wealth and economic power has been a part of the American
psyche. The inheritance of huge fortunes, far beyond any
99. Id. at 9.
l 00. Id. at 13-25.
101. ld. at 8.
102. Id. at 132.
l 03. See l.R.C. section 201 O(c) as in effect for 2001 as result of amendment
by section 50\(a)(l)(B) of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
111 Stat. 788, 845 ("applicable exclusion amount" for 2001 was $675,000).
104. GATES SR. & COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH, supra
note 97, at 138.
l 05. Id. at 17.
.
,, SS 000 000
106. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3) (defining "basic exclusion amount as , •
adjusted for inflation).
s & CHECK
107 Paul A Volcker Foreword to WILLIAM H. GATES R.
T
•
.
'
. WHY AMERICA SHOULD AX
COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH.
ACCUMULATED FORTUNES, al xiii (2002).
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reasonable need for education, for medical care and ti
.
,
or a
comfortable-even luxunous-standard of living has
rested easily with that political philosophy. 10s
never
Professor Joel Dobris is skeptical of the estate tax as a reve
.
or as a means of effectively deconcentrating wealth. 109 He instead ;ue raiser
· ble exercise
· rn
· ' 'po11t1ca
· · I theater and culture:"110
avors the
tax as a des1ra
[T]he crucial purpose of the tax is to assert the hegemony of
the common people and the egalitarian nature of our society;
to undermine oligarchy. To put it crudely, 1 think the
purpose of the tax is to take a little bite out of rich people's
butts, to remind them of the essential nature of this
country. 111
For Professor Dobris, ''it is vital to draw a very bright line between
the prosperous upper middle class and the really rich." 112 He favors an estate
tax exemption of $ I0,000,000 per decedent but "would settle for" 3
$5,000,000 exemption 113-which, with inflation adjustment, is what
Congress has now legislated. 1i-1
Professor Reginald Mombrun favors the estate tax "to prevem
uncontrolled wealth accumulation. " 115 While he favors the estate tax's role as
a revenue raiser, as a repayment for the public services which help to create
wealth, and as a backstop to the income tax, Professor Mombrum 's principal
defense of the tax is that it "promotes equality of economic opportunities by
. concentrations
. of weaIth.,,116
Iessenmg

I 08. Id. at xii.
I09. Joel C. Debris, Federal Transfer Taxes: The Possibility ofRepeal and
the Post Repeal World, 48 CLEV. Sr. L. REV. 709, 725 (2000) [hereinatler Dobris.
Possibility ofRepea[J.
II0. Id.
11 I. Id. at 7 l l.
I 12. Id. at 725.
113. Id.
114. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3) (defining "basic exclusion amount" as S5.000.000
adjusted for inflation).
l 15. Reginald Mombrun, let 's Protect Our Econo1111· and Democra(1fro111
Paris Hilton: The Case for Keeping tht! Estate Tax, 33 01110 N.U. L. R EV. 61, b3
(2007).
116. Id. at 98.
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In a similar vein, Professor Anne Alstott focuses
"h
.· l
·
d
.
upon t e
l
significa~\,Po 1t1ca , economic an social power that possession of wealth
confers:"
[P]rivate wealth remains a source of current social
economic, and political power that goes beyond the potentiai
use of wealth for consumption. In addition to the social and
political influence that wealth creates, the possession of
wealth confers significant economic security; one need not
consume wealth to bask in its benefits. 118
The federal estate tax, Professor Alstott argues, reduces inequality by
"modestly curbing inheritance."119
Professor Michael J. Graetz is skeptical of the federal estate tax as
120
either a revenue raiser or as a device for eliminating great concentrations
121
of inherited wealth.
However, he supports the tax as "providing an
important element of progressivity in the federal tax system." 122
Professor Edward J. McCaffery is an opponent of estate taxation
who sympathizes with the underlying goals of the estate tax but who argues
that the tax fails to implement those goals effectively: 123 "[t]he gift and estate
tax has long since ceased to be a major part of any compelling policy
objective - such as, to name four, raising revenue, instilling progressivity
into the tax system, 'backing up' the income tax, or breaking up large
concentrations of wealth." 124
125
Though these objectives "are more pressing than ever," the estate
tax as adapted by Congress and approved by President Obama in 2012 "is
now largely irrelevant" to these goals. 126 It is accordingly time to abandon
federal estate taxation and instead concentrate reformist energies on more

117. Professor Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against lncome
and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REv.
363, 366 (1996).
118. /d. at 371.
119. Jd. at 375.
93 y
120. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It,
ALE
L. J. 259, 269 (I 983).
121. Id. at 271.
122.Jd.at270-73.
.
. b D't tion123. Edward J. McCaffery, Distracted from D1stractt0n Y ,s rac ·
Reimagining Estate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1235 (20l3).
124. Id. at 1236.
125. Id.
126. Id.

•
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roductive possibilities like "a carryover basis or a realization-on-d
P . ,,m
eath
regime.
.
.
..
While Professor Ltly Batchelder 1s not as cnt1cal of the estate tax ,,x
she nevertheless concludes that it would be better to replace the federal '
. . h .
.
b . .
estate
tax with "a comprehensive m entance tax wit 11 a as1c 11fetime exem 1.
.
II ,,129 A · h .
P ton
and a small annual exemption as we .
n m entance tax would "m
·
d
h · .,130 h
d
ore
fairly allocate econo1111~ bur ~ns a~ong . eirs.
t an oes the estate tax
while simultaneously 1mprovmg the incentives . faced by donors an d
hcirs"' 31 and reducing "the level of tax comp Iextty to some degree." '1~
Moreover Professor Batchelder argues, an inheritance tax would be mor
· hentance
·
transparent' than 1·s the estate tax. iu Sh e wou Id coup 1e an m
tax withe
134
· "ior rn
. I1ente
. d asse t s.
carrvover basis
, In contrast to those who criticize the estate tax while agreeing with
the objectives underlying such a tax, others oppose the estate tax because
inherited wealth should not be taxed. As Professors Graetz and Shapiro
observe,
those fighting to repeal the death tax are tapping into a few
tenets widely felt by the American public: distaste for
imposing a tax when the family's breadwinner dies; desire to
mark one's success in life by building up wealth-a
legacy-and passing it on to children or grandchildren;
admiration of entrepreneurship, small businesses, and family
fanns; and the inherent unfairness of"double taxation."u 5
Curtis S. Dubay of the Heritage Foundation advances this critique,
arguing that the federal estate tax ''slows economic growth, destroys jobs,
and suppresses wages because it is a tax on capital and on
entrepreneurship." 136 Like other opponents of the estate tax, Mr. Dubay
emphasizes the hann the tax inflicts on family-owned businesses, contending
that the tax "reduces the ability of family-owned businesses to expand, hire
127. Id. at 1237.
128. Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case
for a Comprehensil'e Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. Ri::v. I, 68 (2009).
129. Id. at 60.
130. Id. at 67.
131. Id.
132./d.
133. /d
134. Id. at 88.
135. MICIIAEL 1. GRAEl'l & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATII BY A THOUSAND CUTS:
TIIE F!Glll OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 83 (2005 ).
136. Curtis S. Dubay. The Econumic Case Against the Death Tax 24-rn
IIE!ff!AGE FOUND. 8ACK(ifWI JNDER I, 2 (2010).
•
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new workers, and pay higher wages."137 This economic harm h
. "ti d b h
h
, e assens,
cannot be JUStt 1e y t e .revenue
t e estate tax raises , "J·ust above 1 percent
,,1Js
of total federal tax collections.
Moreover, Mr. Dubay contends, the tax is
not "necessary to prevent the accumulation of wealth in a limited few
famt·1·1es.,,139
ln this vein, the Family Business Estate Tax Coalition (FBETC)
favors "full, permanent repeal of the estate tax" because of the tax's impact
14
on family-owned businesses. Chief among FBETC's concerns is the
illiquid nature of family businesses "which can force the new owner to sell
141
the business's assets to pay the tax." Moreover, FBETC objects to the
costs of the planning necessitated by the tax: "Planning costs associated with
the estate tax are a drain on business resources, taking money away from day
to day operations and business investment. These additional costs make it
more difficult for the business owner to expand and create new jobs." 142
For the libertarian commentator Laurence M. Vance, economic
concerns are secondary to the ethical objections to estate taxation:

°

To the libertarian, the arguments against the estate tax all
come down to liberty and property. It doesn't matter if "the
rich" and his heirs can "afford it." The right of the deceased
to dispose of his accumulated wealth - whether it is earned
or "unearned" - is a natural and inviolable right. He may in
fact wish to leave his entire fortune to the government to be
redistributed as bureaucrats see fit. But that must be his
decision, not the state's. Every American should have the
liberty to dispose of his property - in life or in death - as he
sees fit. 143

In political terms, the debate has, until now, focused on whether
there should be a federal estate tax. Thus, little attention has been devoted to
the unlimited nature of the estate tax charitable deduction. However, the
commendable success of the Giving Pledge now gives the deduction salience
as the Pledge constitutes a systematic (albeit inadvertent) threat to the fed~ral
estate tax base. As I suggest in the next section, the Giving Pledge requires
137.ld.at3.
138. Id. at 5.
139.Id.
1· f (\ t
140. FAMILY Bus. ESTATE TAX COAL., http://www.estatetaxre ,e .org as
accessed Sept. 26, 2014).
141. Id. at About Us.

!:t If.aurence M. Vance,(Dec.
A Libertarian View of the Estate Tax,
6, 2010), http://fff.org/explore-freedom
THE

FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUND.,

/article/libertarian-view-estate-tax.
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limits on the estate tax charitable deduction to ensure that all large estates
pay some estate tax.
VI.

THE ARGUMENT FOR LIMITING THE ESTATE TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION

Against this background, I conclude that, in light of the laudable
success of the Giving Pledge, the federal estate tax should be amended to
restrict an estate's charitable deduction to a percentage of the estate, just as
the income tax charitable deduction is limited to a percentage of the
taxpayer's income. The limits on the income tax charitable deduction
represent a sensible compromise among contending policies, a compromise
which should be incorporated into the federal estate tax to ensure that every
large estate pays some estate tax-even if such an estate is totally left to
charity.
A limit to the estate tax charitable deduction could take any of
several forms. The ideal form would be the insertion into the federal estate
tax of the bifurcated limits the Code today imposes on the income tax
deductibility of charitable contributions. Alternatively, less robust
restrictions could be fashioned for the estate tax such as a charitable
deduction limit only applicable to bequests to private foundations or to
certain private foundations. However, less hardy restrictions along these lines
would still permit large estates to avoid federal estate taxation if such estates
are devoted solely to public charities.
It is sensible to encourage charitable bequests to maintain a vibrant
charitable sector and to recognize for tax purposes that charitable bequests,
in important respects, sacrifice personal resources by devoting them to public
purposes. On the other hand, the selection of charitable donees is a
consumption-like power. Charitable bequests, particularly to familycontrolled private foundations, can have a dynastic quality. Much, if not
most, of the wealth of the Giving Pledgers (and other rich decedents)
represents either unrealized appreciation never taxed under the Code or
capital gain taxed at more favorable income tax rates than ordinary income.
Death is the final opportunity for the federal fisc to obtain compensation
from the deceased for the social overhead which helped to create his fortune.
Permitting, but limiting, the estate tax charitable deduction would be a
sensible compromise of these contending policies, as it is a sensible
compromise in the context of the income tax to ensure that everyone pays
some tax, even if they donate all of their income to charity.
For the foreseeable future, the basic features of the federal estate tax
will remain as they are today. There is currently little chance that the federal
estate tax will be abolished or that it will be applied more broadly to smaller
estates. A~ a result of the compromise reached by President Obama and
Congress m 201 2, the Code now embodies the Gates-Volcker-Dobris vision
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of an estate tax which exempts from death taxation what are sometimes
144
called the "mass affiuent." The federal tax today reaches only the estates
of individuals leaving over $5,000,000 adjusted for inflation. 145
While Presidents Reagan and Bush sought to abolish the estate tax
paradoxically, the reforms _t~ey achieved saved the federal estate tax b;
alleviating the strongest pohttcal pressures to abolish the tax. As a result of
the unlimited marital deduction signed into law by President Reagan, 1~6 no
estate tax is due when the first spouse dies. The increases in the unified credit
initiated during the Bush Administration culminated in the exclusion from
taxation of estates under $5,000,000 adjusted for inflation. 147 Thus, a total of
$10,000,000 (inflation adjusted) can be left tax-free by a surviving spouse on
148
his or her demise.
With the tax today falling exclusively on the largest
estates when the surviving spouse dies, much of the political pressure to
abolish the tax has been abated.
In part because the estate tax is now focused exclusively on the
largest estates, the revenue yield of the federal estate tax is modest compared
to the enom1ous amounts generated by fiscal behemoths like the federal
income and payroll taxes. The roughly $7 billion produced annually by the
federal estate tax constitute a mere 0.3 percent of total federal tax
149
revenues.
On the other hand, the fortunes of the Giving Pledgers and their
fellow billionaires are immense. Even without the obligatory reference to
Everett Dirksen, 150 the federal estate tax raises funds in amounts which are
144. Erik J. Greupner, Comment, Hedge Funds Are Headed Down-market:
A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1555, 1573 (accepting the
definition of the "mass affluent" as "those with a net worth between $1 million and
$5 million"); Jacqueline Doherty, B of A's Biggest Bet Ever: Big Risks, and
Rewards, BARRON'S, Sept. 22, 2008, at 27 (defining "mass affluent" as those "with
assets of $100,000 to $3 million").
145. For 2014, the estate tax's inflation-adjusted "basic exclusion amount"
is $5,340,000. Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, § 3.32.
146. Section 403(a)(l )(A) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
Pub.L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 amended section 2056 of the Code to eliminate the
ceiling on the federal estate tax marital deduction.
14 7. Section 20 I 0(c) provides the basic exclusion amount of $5,000,000
increased by post-201 I inflation. I.R.C. § 2010(c).
148. Section 2010(c)(4) facilitates estate planning by today permitting what
is commonly called "portability," that is, the transfer of the first spouse's bas(c
exclusion amount to the estate of the second spouse to die. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(4}. This
permits the second spouse to leave a total of$ I0,000,000 adjusted for inflation on
his subsequent death.
149. Jonathan Schwabish & Courtney Griffith, The U.S. Federal Budget, A
Closer Look at Revenues, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Apr. 17, 2012, http://www.cbo.
gov/publication/43153.
.
I SO. For a thoughtful discussion of whether Senator Dirks_e~ actually mad~
his "billion here, billion there" comment, see "A Billion Here, A B,llwn There · · ·•
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significant to most of us, though the tax is now focused only on the ve

~~ry
If the Giving Pledgers make good on their pledges (as I hope th
do), significant revenue will be lost to the federal fisc as a result of t~y
unlimited estate tax charitable deduction. Most Giving Pledgers will pa e
neither income tax on the unrealized appreciation they accmed while aliv~
nor estate tax on that wealth when they bequeath it to charity. The Giving
Pledge constitutes a systematic, albeit inadvertent, threat to the federal estate
tax base.
. . This brings us back to the question whether charitable donations, by
G1vmg Pledgers or by other wealthy donors, represent consumption or
sacrifice. The limits of the income tax charitable deduction have proved
durable as a compromise reflecting the fact that charitable contributions have
elements of both consumption and sacrifice. As a compromise, those limits
provide tax incentives for giving while ensuring that an individual who
donates her entire income to charity will pay some federal tax.
On the one hand, a donor to charity exercises consumption-style
choice when she designates a charitable donee. She may receive significant
benefits from her donation including public recognition and the
implementation of her personal priorities by the charity receiving her funds.
Celebrity-style charity includes much self-promotion. 151
The argument that charity is consumption is strongest in cases of
donations to family-run private foundations. The family members who serve
as trustees and officers of such a foundation can receive reasonable
compensation for their work on the foundation's affairs with the foundation
counting such compensation as part of its charitable outlays for purposes of
the Code's five percent minimum distribution rule. 152 In addition, as
Professor Miranda Perry Fleischer has observed, control of a private
foundation entails economic and political power in terms of determining who
will receive the foundation's largesse 153 and where the foundation's
endowment will be invested. 154 Moreover, she notes, "control of a charity
THE DIRKSEN CONG. CTR., last updated Sept. 25, 2012, http://www.dirksencenter.
org/print_emd _billionhere.htm.
151. See, e.g., Max Chafkin, Sightseers On a Mission, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Aug. 11, 2013, at MM 18; MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN,
PHILANTIIROCAPITAUSM: How GIVING CAN SAVE THE WORLD 9 (2008) ("At least
since the Live Aid concert in 1985, celebrities and philanthropy have become ever
more entwined. Now, movie and rock star 'celanthropists' are serious partners with
the supcrrich.").
I 52. I.R.C. § 4942(g)(l )(A) (charitable distributions of private foundations
include "reasonable and necessary administrative expenses").
153. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Chariiable Contrih11tiu11.1· in an Ideal Estate
Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263, 286- 87 (2007).
154. /cl. at 287.
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bring with it prominence in a community and such
.
· 1t
· power - muc h the same way being
'
prominence
brings with
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.
d often
1
155
brings with it indirect political power."
ess ea er often
To take one prominent case, Warren Buffett's ch'ld
1
. ·
· J an d economic
· influence
·
significant
po1·tltca
by virtue f thren, exercise
, ...1.. •
.
.
156
h
•
,
.
o
eJT 1<1u1er s
cont:ibut1ons to t e pnvate 1oun~attons they control. Howard Buffett's
charitable efforts come across as smcere and productive 1s1 U 1 .k
her
.
f
h'
h
fi
is
•
nr1
e
ot
well-known mstanccs o 1g pro tie charity, Howard Buffi tt' L- •
'her h'1s nor h'ts ,1am,·1y ,s poltt1cal
. . ambitions and · e d•----'
s Cu~nfy
advances nett
.
15 con ""~ in
159
an obviously thoughtful way.
On the other hand, Mr. Buffett
ids
substan~ial economic and political influence as the head of his ;;:ate
foundation. When Howard Buffett travels to Africa for his anti 1..
. k
. 1 b
-uurigcr
efforts, he 1s ta en very senous Y y government and NGO officials.'so
One wealthy philanthro~ist declined to join the Giving Pledge
because the Pledge can be satisfied by creating and funding ..family.
,,161 s·
controll~d '1oundattons.
. mce the Pledge can be fulfilled through such
found~ttons, Robert w;,,!'tlson reportedly told Bill Gates_ that the Pledge is
"practically worthl~ss.
I am not prepared to go th1s far in light of
admirable efforts hke Howard Buffett's. It is, however, hard to denv that
some, perhaps many, private foundations serve dynastic and self-pro~oting
agendas.

155. Id. at 290.
156. William Alden, Buffett Gives $2 Billion to Gates Fol/11aation, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/buffett-gn es--2billion-to-gates-foundation (discussing contributions to the Susan and HO\\ard
Buffett Foundations).
157. See HOWARD G. BUFFETT, FORTY CHANCES: FrNDC-.G HOPE e. A
HUNGRY WORLD (2013) [hereinafter BUFFETT, FORTY CHANCES}.
158. See, e.g., Andrea Peyser, It's Chelsea Clinton's time, N.Y. POST, NO\
4, 2013, http://nypost.com/2013/l l/04/its-chelsea-c\inton-time (discussing the Bil~
Hillary & Chelsea Clinton Foundation); Maureen Do\\d, Isn't It Rich?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2014, at SRI l (same).
159. Cf Erin Carlyle, The Anti-Paris Hilton, FORBES, Dec. 2. :?013, at &6
( discussing the charity of Liesel Pritzker Simmons).
160. See, e.g., BUFFETT, FORTY CJ-W:ICES, supra note 157, at 74 (~We made
arranoements to meet up with the United Nations World Food Programme (\\"FPI.
which was working in the country. A friendly, capable country director named Dom
and a driver named Douglas met me at the airport in Lilongwe, Mala\\i's main city

and capital.").

.

161. Eleanor Goldberg, Major Philanthropist Refuses To Join Gato
Charity Pledge Because II 's 'Praclically Worthless.' HUFF!NGTON Posr L"-\PACT. l:bt
updated Jan. 25, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014 01/0:? robc!rt-\\ll:....n-

giving-pledge_ n_4531661.html.
162. /d.

Florida Tax Re1·ie1r

[Vol, 16.·7

ofessor Tan\'a D. Marsh argues that the boundaries established .
Pr
J
bl' h . . h
in
between private foundations and pu 1c c ant1es ave subsequently
1969
163
,
both over- and underinclusive. The donor-advised funds operated
bel:ome
· ·
fi
bv community foundations and by commerc1a1 investment 1rms, ~he argues,
effectirely private foundations (though th~ law does not classify them as
no longer controlled by the
sue h) while institutions like the Ford Foundation,
..
founding family, are effectively public entities.
Even if the Code's current distinction between public charity and
private foundations is not perfect, it ~aptures an imp.ortant re.ality, namely,
that family-controlled private foundations often entail fi?ancial benefit, as
well as political, economic and social power, for the family controlling that
foundation. In important respects, bequests to such foundations have
consumption and dynastic qualities and represent wealth passed on to the
donor's family, even when such family-controlled foundations do admirable
work. If, as Professor Marsh suggests, Congress revises for income tax
purposes the definition of a private foundation to reflect post-1969
developments, that updated definition can be used for the estate tax as well.
On the other hand, as Professors Andrews, Bittker, and Turnier
argue, charity is different from other personal outlays because of the benefits
charitable donations confer on others. Even when charitable donations reflect
affluent tastes, for example, contributions to art museums and private
schools, donors are sharing their wealth with others. Donations to museums
and prep schools may have redistributive impact if, for example, such
164
donations enable museums to adopt free admissions policies
or allow
private schools to expand their scholarship programs for low-income
students.
To return to the example of the Buffett family members and their
private foundations, the Buffetts are using their money differently and more
admirably than are other billionaires who instead engage in what Professor
Andrews dubbed "private, preclusive household consumption." 165
The limits on the income tax charitable deduction as framed in 1969
have been stable because such limits strike a defensible balance amona these
contending policies. This compromise should be emulated in the federal
estate_ tax by limiting that tax's deduction for charitable bequests, 166 thereby
ensuring that all large estates pay some estate tax, even if they devolve
entirely to charity.

a;e

.
163. T~ya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction: Rethinking Tax Treatment of
Pnvate Foundatwns and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV. ] 37 (2002).
164. See, for example, the free general admission policy of The Walters Art
Museum, last accessed Oct. I, 2014, http://thewalters.org.
165. Andre_w~, P~rsonal Deductions, supra note 65 .
. 166. Any_ hm1tat1on t~ the estate tax charitable deduction should also appl
to the gift tax chantable deduction.
y
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e uctton. could take
several c1orms. The best possibility is the whol
. any 0 f
1
income tax's charitable deduction limits into tehsa e incorporation of the
, bequests to pubhc
. charities and qualify" e estate
tax· Under th'
approac11,
('
. is
· ) ·
mg 1.e., pass-thru active
and supportmg pnvate foundations would be deducfIb\
'
'
168 B
e up to 50 percent of
the estate.
equests to all other private foundations wo ld b d d 'b
to thirty percent of the estate. In this way the estate tax (ul"k teh ~ uctt le up
.
.
'
1 e e income tax)
wou.ld, by grantmg
the deduction, encourage charitable donat·ions to rnamtam
· ·
.
a vital chantable ~ector and woul~ also recognize that charity's public
benefits make chantable bequests different from direct bequests to famil,
m~b~.
)

t

.Simult~neously, .limiting the deduction would recognize the
competm~ cl~m1s: chantable contributions are, in important respects,
consumpt1on-hke. Bequests to family foundations have a dynastic quality.
Under current law, much wealth of the Giving Pledgers and their billionaire
peers will, prior to death, never be taxed or will be taxed at lower capital gain
rates. Death is the final opportunity for the federal fisc to obtain
compensation from the affluent decedent for the social overhead which
helped to create his fortune. Despite its commendable qualities, the Giving
Pledge is a systematic, although unintended, threat to the estate tax base.
A limit on the estate tax charitable deduction would reconcile the
Buffett-Gates commitment to federal estate taxation (by guaranteeing that all
large estates pay some estate tax) with the agenda of Buffett-Gates Giving
Pledge (by incenting bequests to charity).
An alternative attempt at such reconciliation might instead argue for
estate taxation only for those who don't leave their w~a\th to cha~ity.
Supporting this approach and an unlimited estate tax ~hantable _deduction,
Bill and Melinda Gates can plausibly contend that thelf foundat~on spends
their money for good causes more productively and more efficiently than
would the federal government. From this vantage, the estate tax pr~ds the
wealthy to give to charity, but should not be levied when wealth m fact
devolves to charity.

167. Bittker, Matching Grants, supra note 68 d by the marital deduction
168. The limits would apply _10. the ~state re ~~: deductible under section
of section 2056 and debts and admmistrat1ve expen
2053. See I.R.C. §§ 2053, 2056.
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However, as Bill Gates, Sr. persuasively asserts, 169 large fortu
~
. .
nes and
the owners of sueh 1ortunes receive important public services fro
inefficient federal government. Moreover, most of the Gates and Bm ~he
fortunes consists of appreciated Microsoft and Berkshire-Hathaway sto ~ ett
which the Gates and Buffett families will pay little or no federal income ton
because they will never engage in a taxable sale. 170 If the Gates and B:ffcax
families do not pay federal estate tax on this wealth, 171 they.will effectiv ~tt
pay no fed~ral _tax at all-despite the public ~ontribution to that wea~ti
eloquently h1ghhghted by Attorney Gates. There 1s a dynastic quality even t
the most commendable of private foundations. And not all privai°
foundations are so commendable.
e
172
Consider in this context a widowed Giving Pledger whose estate
will consist of one billion dollars and who has paid no federal income tax on
the unrealized appreciation of this fortune. Suppose further that this Giving
Pledger plans to leave this entire amount to a private foundation controlled
by his children. The Giving Pledger will pay no federal income tax on this
appreciation while alive. Under current law, the Pledger's estate will
subsequently bear no federal estate tax on his death since the entire billion
dollars going to charity will be fully deductible for estate tax purposes. lf,
instead, a 30 percent deduction limit applied to this bequest to his family's
private foundation and if the federal estate tax rate remains at 40 percent, this
estate will pay federal estate taxes of $280 million. 173 How might our
theoretical Giving Pledger respond to this change of law?
Perhaps not at all. He might still leave his entire estate to the private
foundation controlled by his children except that, after the payment of
federal estate taxes, this foundation would receive $720 million rather than
the full one billion dollars. This outcome would constitute Professor Dobris's
"little bite" 174 since, in this scenario, the Pledger's children would still
control a private foundation with formidable resources-though somewhat

169. GATES SR. & COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH, supra
note 97, at 110.
170. Federal income tax is only imposed if there is a "sale or other
disposition of property." I.R.C. §§ 6l(a)(3), I00l(a), (c).
.
171. Again, in this context, the reference to the estate tax includes the
federal gift tax as well.
172. A Giving Pledger who leaves a surviving spouse might prefer to leave
her assets to her surviving spouse pursuant to the unlimited estate tax marital
deduction and instead have the surviving spouse make the ultimate bequest to
charity. I.R.C. § 2056 (estate tax marital deduction).
.
173. 30 percent of the one billion dollars going to charity will be de?uct1ble,
leaving a net taxable estate of $700 million. At the 40 percent bracket, this would
produce tax of $280 million.
174. Dobris, Possibility ofRepeal, supra note I09, at 71 I.
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less resources than if the full donation were deductible for estate tax
purposes.
this Giving
Pledger
. Alternatively,
.
.
. ' now confronted wi·th an estate tax
chantable d~ducht10n capped ldikedthe_mcome tax charitable deduction, might
50 perhce~t e u~tton for his estate, either by switching his
seek to obtam t . ebl'
bequest to a pu 1c c anty which qualifies for the higher 50
· 1· ·
b
d'fy•
.
.
percent
ded~ct1on ~mtt or y mo 1 mg his family foundation to qualify for that
limit. ln either case, the federal estate tax would be reduced to $200
175
million.
A third possible response is that, confronted with a restricted estate
tax charitabl_e deduction, ~his Givin~ Pledger will donate to charity only
amounts _which are de~ucttbl~ and will leave the remainder of his post-tax
estate duectly to his family. Yet other possible responses include
bequeathing to the family foundation the maximum deductible amount of
$300 million, imparting to public charities the additionally deductible
amount of $200 million, and passing to the children the $300 million
remaining after the payment of federal estate taxes of $200 million.
We cannot predict the response of any particular Giving Pledger (or
of any other wealthy individual) to a federal estate charitable deduction
limited along the lines of the income tax charitable deduction. We can,
however, predict that, as a result of these limits, federal revenues will be
greater and the amount received by the charities will be less. 1n simplest
terms, that change would impart to the estate tax the same compromise
embodied in the income tax, namely, to incent charitable giving (particularly
to public charities and qualifying private foundations) while ensuring that
every large estate pays some tax, even if it devolves entirely to charity.
Instead of incorporating into the estate tax the charitable deduction
limits of the income tax, a different limit might be fashioned for the estate
tax. For example, bequests to public charities could remain estate tax
deductible in full while bequests to private foundations would be subject to a
deduction cap of 30 percent or SO percent of the estate. By limiting the
deductibility only of bequests to private foundations, such a cap would
acknowledge the dynastic qualities of such foundations while more strongly
encouraging bequests to public charities through an unlimited deduction.
This approach would have the benefit of neu~lizin~ the political
opposition of public charities. Public charities, ~ ~0~1dable interest group,
will oppose restrictions on the estate tax deducttb1hty of _bequests to them.
However public charities might be indifferent to (or might perhaps even
favor) ceilings which only cap the estate tax deductibilit~ of amounts sent to
their competitors for donors' dollars (i.e., private foundations.)
175 Fifty percent of the billion dollars going to charity will be de?uctible,
leaving a ne~ taxable estate of $500 million. At the 40 percent bracket, lhis would
produce tax of $200 million.
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Limiting the estate tax deduction only for contrib t·
·
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•
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u ions to p .
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·
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sate
. approac h ts
· that 1t
· wou Id, via
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to all private foundations, treat the same way both donation or bequests
admirable private foundations, like the Gates and Buffett fou~~ tt? wholly
·
· pnvate
·
·
donauons
to Iess deserving
foundations.
While I think a tons ' and
176
most of u
know the Iatter when we see them,
I see no administrabl
s
distinguishing in statutory language "good" private foundations wh~c;ay of
nd
their funds productively and. efficiently from their less adm~peb
1ra le
counterparts. Thus, under this approach, all bequests to all p •
foundations would be subject to the same estate tax deduction limit.
nvate
A third possible version of the estate tax charitable deduction Ii •
would leave unrestricted the deduction for bequests to public charities and~tt
private foundations qualifying for the higher income tax deduction limit tha~
. pass-thru, operating,
.
. ;.'1oun
. dat1ons.
.
in
.
'
1s,
and supporting
The celling
on estate
tax charitable deductions would thus apply only to nonqualifying private
foundations currently subject to the lower, 30 percent income tax deduction
limit. 178 These are the foundations most prone to dynastic accumulations in
the hands of the decedent's family since these nonqualifying foundations do
not pass through their resources, do not conduct active operations, and do not
support public charities.
Under this alternative also, federal estate tax would be totally
avoidable if an estate were to be bequeathed in its entirety to public charities
or to qualifying private foundations. Such an alternative would, however,
improve current law by getting more estates to pay some estate tax. Such an
approach would also provide the strongest tax incentives for bequests to the
public charities and qualifying private foundations for whom the estate tax
charitable deduction would remain uncapped.
Like all compromises, none of these alternatives will satisfy those
who occupy the polar positions. A libertarian ethically opposed to estate
taxation will logically reject any limit on the estate tax charitable deduction
as reinforcing the burden of an illegitimate tax. Similarly, no limit on the
estate tax charitable deduction will appeal to those who see nothing different
between charity and other outlays and who disapprove of the use the estate
tax to encourage charitable legacies. However, for those who view the
]imitations of the income tax charitable deduction as a plausible and durable

176. Nathaniel Zelinsky, Fifty Years of ·•1 know it when I see ii, "
OPINIONS, June 19, 2014, http://www.concurringopinions.com/
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archives/a uthor/nathaniel-zelinsky.
.
177. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
I 78. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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compromise among contendi~g ~onsiderations, the same or a similar
compromise should be compellmg m the context of the estate tax.
If t~at is not a progra_m which wil! lead legions to the political
barricades, 1t does reflect a sensible compromise among contending conce
and would align_ the p~licy of t~e income tax (which currently lim~
charitable deductions) with the pohcy of the estate tax (which today does
not).

VII.

CONCLUSION

The Giving Pledge, an admirable effort to channel wealth to charity,
requires us to confront the paradox that the federal estate tax charitable
deduction is unlimited while the federal income tax charitable deduction is
capped. In light of the commendable success of the Giving Pledge, we
should revisit this paradox. If a Giving Pledger makes good on his
commitment to leave his wealth to charity, the federal fisc losses significant
revenue since the Pledger thereby avoids federal estate taxation as charitable
bequests are deductible without limit for federal estate tax purposes. Despite
its laudable qualities, the Giving Pledge is a systematic (albeit inadvertent)
threat to the estate tax base.
The Giving Pledge requires the amendment of the federal estate tax
to restrict an estate's charitable deduction to a percentage of the estate, just
as the income tax charitable deduction is limited to a percentage of the
taxpayer's income. In this fashion, the sensible compromise embedded in the
income tax charitable deduction would be carried over to the federal estate
tax to simultaneously encourage charitable giving while ensuring that all
large estates pay some federal estate tax.
The Giving Pledge need not be the death knell of the federal estate
tax. It should instead be the catalyst to refonn the tax by limiting the estate
tax charitable deduction.

